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Migration, Ethnicity and Conflict in Southeast Asia1
Riwanto Tirtosudarmo 
Abstrak
Konflik kekerasan merupakan ancaman paling nyata bagi 
pembangunan berkelanjutan dalam setiap masyarakat. Sumber konflik 
biasanya berasal dari peperangan antar-negara. Akan tetapi, selama 
lima puluh tahun terakhir, sumber konflik telah berubah dan sebagian 
besar berkaitan erat dengan proses nation-buliding di negara-negara 
pascakolonial, seperti di Asia, Afrika, dan Amerika Latin. Di negara-
negara yang baru terbentuk, konflik yang bersumberkan pilihan 
ideologi negara adalah yang paling umum. Jika tidak terselesaikan, 
konflik berujung pada pemisahan atau pembagian wilayah negara-
negara yang bersengketa, seperti kasus China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, 
dan beberapa contoh konflik dalam kilas balik sejarah. Ketika ideologi 
berperan penting,  konflik tidak bisa dilihat dari pengaruh faktor-
faktor non-politik seperti demografi dan etnisitas saja. Konflik yang 
berdasarkan mayoritas-minoritas selalu terkait dengan komposisi 
demografis populasi tersebut di mana etnisitas, agama, dan ekonomi 
terbawa ke dalam konstelasi politik setelah Perang Dingin. Konflik 
etnis tidak terselesaikan dan terkadang berujung pada disintegrasi 
negara-bangsa. Terputusnya hubungan Uni Soviet dengan negara-
negara satelitnya, pemisahan negara-negara bagian Yugoslavia, 
dan mungkin Indonesia merupakan beberapa contoh kasus ini. Myron 
Weiner, Thomas Homer-Dixon, dan Milica Zarkovis Bookman merupakan 
penggagas studi tentang hubungan antara demografi, politik, dan 
konflik. Komposisi etno-demografis dan pengaruhnya dalam proses 
nation-building telah ditelaah melalui berbagai macam teori terkait 
dengan konflik kekerasan. Tulisan ini merupakan sebuah upaya untuk 
memperkaya wacana tentang hubungan populasi dan konflik dengan 
mengacu kerangka pengetahuan yang ada dan bukti empiris yang 
terdapat di wilayah Asia Tenggara.
Kata kunci: demografi, migrasi, konflik etnis, negara-bangsa, konflik kekerasan, 
populasi.
1      This is a slightly revised version of a paper presented at Graduate School of Humanities and 
Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba, Japan, 15 February 2011. The original version of this 
paper was published as “Population, ethnicity and violent conflict”, at Population Review, 
Volume 45, Number 1, 2006.
Riwanto Tirtosudarmo4
As one might expect in a region with deeper sources of political instability and 
fewer democratic traditions, the ways in which population issues and politics have 
intersected have been harsher…
                                                      Michael S Teitelbaum and Jay Winter (1998:5). 
This is an exploratory essay aiming to search for explanation of the 
relationship between population, ethnicity and violent conflict with reference 
to the situation in the Asian region – particularly in Southeast Asia. The main 
issue that will be explored is the overlap among the disciplines of demography, 
anthropology/sociology and politics. Although ethnicity related violent 
conflicts have become the major features of our time, research studies that 
directly confront the interconnection of population, ethnicity and conflict are 
still very rare. 
In 1995, a sociologist, Calvin Goldscheider, edited a book on the linkages 
between ethnicity and population processes in the context of nation building. 
Population, Ethnicity and Nation-Building is perhaps a pioneer in the field of 
population studies where ethnicity is prominently featured as an important 
factor in the dynamics of demographic changes and political developments. 
Indeed, in the mid 1990s, it culminated in the pervasiveness of ethnicity - as 
shown in the preface to the book: 
Hardly a day passes that issues of ethnic conflict do not appear on the front 
pages of our newspapers, on the evening news, or in special magazine articles 
and television programs. Ethnic-based issues have become conspicuous in the 
revolutions in Eastern Europe and in the collapse of the Soviet Union. They 
are central to emerging societies, economies, and politics of Asia, Africa, 
and the Middle East. They are continuing features of the politics of race and 
immigration in Western pluralistic nations decades after assimilation, economic 
development, discrimination, ethnic identification, and the salience of ethnic 
communities. Ethnicity, linked to discrimination and racism, remains the source 
of intergenerational disadvantage and inequality in countries around the world– 
East, West, and South. 
Since then, we have witnessed the flourishing of research studies and 
publications on ethnic conflicts within different disciplines. Interestingly, 
studies that focus on the relationships of population, ethnicity and conflict are 
still very limited. The discipline of demography and population study seems 
unmoved by the increasing issues of ethnic conflicts that have rapidly become 
the major research agenda among the various disciplines of the social sciences 
and humanities. Only recently IUSSP (International Union for the Scientific 
Study of Population) began to bring the issues of demography and conflict 
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into their professional organization.2 In the literature, the connection between 
demography and conflict is generally treated indirectly or analysed only 
superficially. The provinciality that is still very strong among the different social 
science disciplines could be the major reason that hinders the development of 
interdisciplinary study on this issue. This essay is a modest attempt to fill the 
gap in the footsteps of previous pioneering scholars such as Weiner, Homer-
Dixon and Bookman that integrate demography with the studies of politics 
and conflict. The paper starts with a discussion on a theoretical framework 
explaining the relationship between population dynamics and conflict, 
followed by a more specific examination of the relationship between migration 
- one of the three main components of population dynamics - and conflict. 
Within this theoretical framework, it elaborates the changing paradigm of 
viewing security threats: from geopolitics to ecodemography.  Before closing 
with some illustrations from Southeast Asia, it examines the role of ethnicity 
in nation building and the contribution of population dynamics to the impact 
of ethnicity on nation building. 
Framing the population conflict nexus
The interest in the linkage between demographic changes and politics began 
when in a 1971 essay Myron Weiner (1971: 667) explains what he means by 
political demography: 
Political demography is the study of the size, composition, and distribution of 
population in relation to both government and politics. It is concerned with the 
political consequences of population change, especially the effect of population 
change on the demands made upon governments, on the performance of 
governments, and on the distribution of political power. It also considers the 
political determinants of population change, especially the political causes of 
the movement of people, the relationship of various population configurations 
to the structures and functions of government, and the public policy directed at 
affecting the size, composition, and distribution of populations. Finally, in the 
study of political demography it is not enough to know the facts and figures 
of populations – that is the fertility, mortality, and migration rates; it is also 
necessary to consider the knowledge and attitudes that people have toward 
population issues.
2       In June 2002 the IUSSP Regional Conference in Bangkok organized a special panel on migra-
tion and conflict. In November 2003 IUSSP organized a workshop that examined particularly 
the overlap between demography and conflict research and posed such questions as: What 
can demographers and conflict researchers learn from one another? What is known about 
the population dynamics of conflict? Is there a theoretical framework to guide our under-
standing of the demography of conflict and violence?  In relation to ethnicity the workshop 
aimed to discuss such questions as: What is the role of ethnicity, religion and other group 
characteristics in the generation of conflict and when do they become a cause of conflict? 
How do political leaders make use of societal cleavages to spur conflict or war? Under what 
circumstances can population policy become an instrument exacerbating or leading to con-
flict? Among the publications resulting from this workshop see the special issue of Journal of 
Peace Research, volume 42, number 4, 2005.
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While Weiner provides a broad explanation of the relationship between 
demography and politics, further elaboration is needed to link population 
and conflict. Conflict is indeed located in a central place in the studies that 
are concerned with human affairs. Systematic understanding of the relation 
between conflict and population, however, still generally needs to be further 
developed. In the early1980s, in the heyday of population research and the 
increasing need to control the rapid population increase in the developing 
world, understanding the ramifications of population dynamics and conflict at 
the international level became very important. The apparent communication 
deadlock between the pronatalist and antinatalist camps in the First World 
Population Conference in 1974 in Bucharest, loomed large and mirrored the 
conflicting ideologies and divided policy perceptions on population.  Partly 
in response to the existing global situation, Nazli Choucri, a professor of 
international politics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Boston, 
wrote in 1984 on the interconnection of population and conflict. Arguing 
that: …conflict is a central feature of all political behaviour, at all levels of human 
interaction, and the prominence of population variables in shaping political behaviour 
places population issues and conflict in close proximity. Following Choucri’s 
argument, we see that the connection between population and conflict is not 
straightforward but through what she calls political behaviour.  As a simple 
proposition, her argument can be shown as    
Population variables --------political behaviour ---------conflict
Population variables, according to Choucri, shape political behaviour 
and through political behaviour conflict will (or will not) occur. In the field 
of demography – that studies human population – population variables 
are basically related to three ‘vital events’, namely fertility, mortality and 
migration. The features of population phenomena that are confined to its size, 
its growth and its geographic distribution have been influenced by the change 
and the dynamics of its fertility, mortality and migration. While population 
variables in the narrow sense are the study field of demography, in social 
reality they cannot be isolated in a vacuum. Population variables have 
always been intersected with other social variables, including the economy, 
politics and culture; that in turn construct the social contexts in which human 
behaviour - including political behaviour - is performed. As Choucri clearly 
demonstrates, conflict is the central feature of all political behaviour. Political 
behaviour in its narrow sense has become a field of political science. Adrian 
Leftwitch, a lecturer in politics at the University of York, in his book Redefining 
Politics: People, Resources and Power, published in 1983, defines politics as 
follows: 
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Politics consists of all the activities of cooperation and conflict, within and between 
societies, whereby the human species goes about obtaining, using, producing and 
distributing resources in the course of the production and reproduction of its 
social and biological life.  
He further notes that:
…these activities are not isolated from other features of social life. They everywhere 
influence, and are influenced by, the distribution of power and decision making, 
the systems of social organization, culture and ideology in a society, as well as its 
relations with the natural environment and other societies. Politics is therefore a 
defining characteristic of all human groups, and always has been.  
According to Leftwitch, cooperation and conflict are two important features 
of political activities (or behaviour) that occur in a society. It is through 
cooperation and conflict that human behaviours are basically conducted in 
every space and arena such as in families, groups of kin or tribes; in villages, 
towns, regions, nation-states or associations; and, in the modern world, on 
a global basis. The central point that Leftwitch proposes is that the politics of 
societies – including but not exclusively the government – exist at every level 
and in every sphere are inextricably involved with how resources are used, 
produced, organized, distributed and redistributed, by whom, and with what 
consequences. Resources, according to Leftwitch, include capital, land, income, 
labour and other natural resources and also things such as time, education, 
status, influence, health and knowledge. The process of achieving sustainable 
development in any society will be a constant process of negotiation between 
conflict and cooperation that constitute the fundamentals of politics.
The changing global political context at the end of the 1980s and in the 
early 1990s, especially after the Cold War was ending, has provided a new 
situation in which the tensions and conflicts were no longer bipolarized but 
becoming more diverse.  The old, conventional wars have been replaced by 
what Mary Kaldor terms ‘the new wars’. According to Kaldor (2001) new wars 
can be distinguished from old wars as their goal was the matter of identity politics 
rather than ideology and geopolitics and involved various types of groups such 
as paramilitary units, local warlords, criminal gangs rather than hierarchical 
military units and most casualties were civilians rather than combatants. 
The defining politics as put forward by Leftwitch need to be adapted to the 
current situation whereby identity politics in the context of the new wars, 
dominate the world scene as Kaldor argues. It is therefore very appropriate at 
this historical juncture to look at ethnicity as it is generally understood as the 
major source of human identity. Ethnicity is among the main social markers 
by which cultural boundaries among various groups of people are delineated. 
Conflict and cooperation, according to Leftwitch, among different culturally 
defined groups constitute the identity politics that will be the concern in the 
discussion on population, ethnicity and conflict.
Riwanto Tirtosudarmo8
Migration and Conflict
As briefly mentioned above, at the international level the contentious 
connections between demography and politics, began to be discussed at the 
First World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974. The Conference, 
which was initiated by the UN, was intended to look at the increasing pressing 
issues of world population growth, particularly in the poor-south-developing 
countries. The rapid rate of population growth in the poor countries was 
perceived as a world socio-economic problem and a political security threat 
particularly as seen by the rich industrialised countries. It is very interesting 
that the delegates at this Conference clearly fell into two camps when they 
had to discuss the causes of and the remedies for rapid population growth. 
The first camp, mostly dominated by the countries that had links with the 
Socialist-Communist bloc, strongly argued that the remedies to the problem 
ought to be sought by redressing the global order, which tended to benefit the 
rich countries. In contrast, the other camp, dominated by the Western-Liberal 
countries, argued that birth control on a massive scale should be introduced 
systematically in order to sustain sufficient economic development.3 
While the scholarly works on demography are understandably geared 
towards interpreting the mechanics of population growth, migration and 
population mobility are generally treated as only marginal factors in relation 
with population growth. As the development approach people focused their 
attention on the poor-south-developing countries, internal migration – mostly 
rural to urban – received their primary attention in conjunction with economic 
development.4 Weiner was the only one who gave serious thought to the causal 
relationship between migration and politics until this theme emerged into 
the mainstream demographic discourse around the mid 1990s, when ethnic 
conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia erupted. The attempt to connect migration 
to politics, therefore, emerged rather late, compared to its connection to
economics. Myron Weiner, a political scientist at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology  (MIT) – who is also a modernisation theorist – was among the 
pioneers who looked at the correlation between migration (and demography 
in general) and political behaviour. His research, based on Indian politics, 
provides an analysis of how internal migration of a particular ethnic group 
(the Assamese) created political change in their new place of residence.5 As 
stated above, Weiner is the political scientist who introduced the term
3 Finkle and Crane (1975) provide a comprehensive analysis of the politics of the World 
Population Conference in Bucharest in the first issue of the new journal published by the 
Population Council in New York Population and Development Review. Since then,  Finkle 
regularly provides commentary analysis on the politics of subsequent world population 
conferences (Mexico City, 1984 and Cairo, 1994).
4 An example of research work on rural-urban migration is a book by Jack Caldwell (1969) 
African Rural-Urban Migration: The Movement to Ghana’s Towns. While a contending Marxist 
explanation is given by Samir Amin (1974) in his book Modern migration in Western Africa.
5 Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1978).
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‘political demography’ after his involvement in a US funded research team 
charged with finding a solution to the problem of population growth in the 
poor developing countries in the early 1970s. Since then, Weiner developed 
his thinking on international migration and security.6 In 1992 he published an 
article in International Security that exposed the perspective of the security/
stability framework (SSF). He contrasted with the international political 
economic framework (IPEF) and put forward by the economists.
According to Weiner, economists have discussed many issues concerning 
economic differences or inequalities between countries that influenced 
migration. Political scientists have also discussed conflicts that led to a wave of 
political refugees leaving a country. However, very few economists provided 
the necessary attention to how international migration created conflict within 
or between countries - that is, how to examine international migration as 
an independent variable, rather than as a dependent variable. According 
to Weiner, a discussion like this is very important in understanding why a 
country and its citizens always have a negative attitude towards international 
migration, even though they are aware of the economic benefits brought 
about by this kind of migration. Weiner further explains what is meant by 
SSF, which he carefully differentiates from what had long been known as the 
international political economic framework (IPEF). 
IPEF explains international migration mainly by focusing on the existence 
of global inequality and economic relationships between the sending and the 
receiving countries. These relationships include the movement or shift of 
capital and technology, the role of the transnational institutions and structural 
changes in the labour market which are closely related to the international 
division of labour. SSF focuses on national policies concerning international 
migration which are created, because of concerns about the impact of migration 
on internal political stability and international security. This means, therefore, 
that SSF puts considerable emphasis on the understanding of political 
change within a country as the main determinant of international and internal 
migration, including the wave of refugees both as a cause and an effect of 
international conflict.
IPEF and SSF, however, have obvious similarities. Both have shifted 
from approaches which up until now have maintained that migration is a 
result of individual decision making to an approach which looks at migration 
in the context of wider social, political and economic changes. Both use an 
interactive framework that emphasizes the relationship between the processes 
of migration on the one hand and the processes of global change on the other. 
6 In 1998 Myron Weiner invited the author to join a workshop at MIT to discuss the broad 
theme of ‘demography and security’. The papers presented at this workshop were later 
published as a book in 2001 by Berghahn entitled Demography and National Security. The 
author’s Chapter in this book shows the security aspects of transmigration policy in 
Indonesia (Tirtosudarmo 2001). For a more expanded discussion on migration, development 
and security see Tirtosudarmo 2005b.
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Both pay attention to the behaviour of a country and the importance of its 
national borders. Compared with IPEF, SSF emphasizes the importance of 
decisions taken by a country, whereas the role of a country is always treated 
lightly by IPEF, which is more likely to consider the global strength as the 
main determinant. Both concepts also present different arguments about 
aspects of international migration. They raise different questions, advance 
different explanations about international mobility and   provide different 
concepts of analysis. Although both reinforce or supplement each other, the 
lines of advanced argument are seldom the same. IPEF, for example, may use 
an analysis which looks at population mobility from a poor to a rich country 
as something of mutual benefit (the poor benefits from remittances while the 
rich benefits from the cheap labour which it requires). 
SSF, on the other hand, may see the same population mobility as having 
political consequences, namely changes in ethnic composition in the receiving 
country, which may result in friction in the relationship between the two 
countries as a consequence of the conflict between migrants and the local 
communities. In another example, the IPEF approach can lead to a conclusion 
that migration leads to a brain drain from the sending country and worsens the 
unemployment and housing problems in the receiving country. Conversely, 
SSF looks at population migration as something that can improve the internal 
security of a country and international peace, because migrants from ethnic 
minorities who are not socially accepted in their countries of origin can be 
accepted in the host countries. A cost benefit analysis can therefore lead to a 
different evaluation and policies depending on the framework applied.
According to the analysis that was expounded based on IPEF, international 
migration often connotes two very important political elements: First, 
international migration usually occurs because it is supported or encouraged 
by governments for reasons that do not have any economic relationship at all to 
migration. For example, according to Weiner, the international migration that 
took place in Africa and South Asia had little or completely no relationship with 
global changes or politico-economic changes in the two regions; Secondly, if 
economic factors are the cause of population migration, it is the governments 
which determine whether these people should be allowed to leave their 
countries of origin, while the receiving countries ultimately decide whether 
to accept or reject these migrants. Government policy is not always based on 
economic considerations. Furthermore, there are variations in governments’ 
abilities to control migrants entering their countries. A country may be able to 
use military power to defend itself from foreign aggression but may not have 
the power to defend itself from migrants entering it illegally to look for job 
opportunities. A country which endeavours to control the entrance of illegal 
migrants may not have the ability to stop them, but may consider it as a threat 
to its sovereignty. For this reason, therefore, an understanding of the political 
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dimensions of international migration is vital and crucial in analysing the 
phenomenon of international migration.
From Geopolitics to Eco-demographic Security Threats
In the last three decades, studies of the impact of immigration flows from 
the poor-south countries into the rich-north countries have flourished. These 
studies, eventually published as books, reports and journal articles, reflect 
the increasing tensions felt by governments and societies in rich countries 
regarding the likely negative impacts of immigration. The motivations of 
people who move to the rich countries vary, but they are generally prompted 
by economy related causes. Economic difficulties that are increasingly felt at 
home and the availability of migration channels already established among 
people from the former European colonies, provide the impetus for migration 
chains between countries of origin and destination. In this period, studies 
dealing with cultural implications began to emerge, in addition to those 
concerned with the more conventional economic and political implications 
of immigration.
In this academic-policy environment, immigration is still generally not 
perceived as a security issue. The perception that migration – particularly 
immigration to Western European and Nordic countries – contains a security 
threat was only developed after the tragic events in Bosnia and Kosovo 
where violent ethnic conflicts between Muslims and Christians erupted 
in the early1990s. The people in the rich-north countries started perceiving 
that conflict in poor countries might affect their sovereignty.  The conflict in 
Rwanda between the Tutsis and Hutus7 was another event that sharpened 
this perception. As a result of these and other conflicts, studies on communal 
and ethnic conflicts in various forms began to flourish.8 These studies also 
show departure from, and the abandonment of, the formerly dominant 
modernization and development perspectives. 
The premise of modernization and development theories that societies 
would move towards modernity and leave their primordial sentiments 
behind and shift towards more class based societies have been shown to 
be generally unproven. The apparently pervasive role of ethnicity in many 
societies undergoing economic development shows the fundamental flaws 
of modernization and development paradigms. Among the most influential 
recent works that seek to explain conflict and population related issues are the 
research published by Thomas Homer-Dixon, a political scientist based at the 
University of Toronto  - working closely with his former MIT colleagues in 
Boston - and the work of Robert Kaplan, a prolific journalist who works for the 
7 Mahmod Mamdani (2001) argues that the long historical processes of ethnic construction 
under European colonialism played a crucial role in the development of  tensions and 
conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis
8 See among others, studies by Gurr (1993; 2000) and Varsney (2003)
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Atlantic Monthly in New York.9  In his influential essay, ‘The Coming Anarchy: 
How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, and Disease are rapidly Destroying 
the Social Fabric of Our Planet’ Kaplan conjured up a surreal picture of an African 
continent in the throes of an apocalyptic crisis: overpopulated, undernourished, and 
driven to barbaric acts of violence by irrational spirit power. While Homer-Dixon 
represents the new voice of academia mirroring the emerging neo Malthusian 
perspectives, Kaplan’s talent brings the horror of environmental problems 
caused by overpopulation in poor developing countries into the minds of 
people in the rich Western countries.
Homer-Dixon was invited to give a presentation on his population 
and conflict theory at the experts’ meeting preceding the World Population 
Conference in Cairo in 1994, the proceedings of which were later developed 
into a book entitled Environment, Scarcity, and Violence.10  According to Homer-
Dixon, as well as Kaplan in more popular language, poverty in the developing 
world is still basically the root-cause of political conflict. Both Homer-Dixon and 
Kaplan strongly argue that uncontrolled population growth in the poor-south 
countries will eventually encroach into the surrounding environments. In the 
process of population encroachment into their surrounding environments, 
conflict over scarce resources - and anarchy – the term used by Kaplan 
-becomes inevitable and constitutes the major security threat and the order 
of the day. Homer-Dixon’s theory on population and conflict interestingly 
continues reflecting the popular perception and concern of the people in the 
rich-north countries on the ramifications of unchecked population growth 
in the poor-south countries, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
The contention on population issues was previously constructed within 
the context of a bipolarised world and the Cold War in which conflict was 
perceived as part of the geopolitical tensions between different ideological 
camps. However, since the early 1990s, the issue has shifted into a new centre 
of gravity, with ecodemographic security perceived as a new threat coming 
from the poor-south countries.
The spectre of conflict emanating from demographic changes as clearly 
theorized by Homer-Dixon is no longer associated with the world ideology 
and geopolitics, but with the issue of environment and resource scarcities. 
In other words, both Homer-Dixon and Kaplan shift the discourse on 
global security threats from the conventional political issues that concern 
state sovereignty and traditional warfare into more fluid and disguised 
ecodemographic interconnected security threats. The implication for foreign 
9 Robert Kaplan has traveled extensively in many ‘trouble spots’ in the ‘third world’. His 
famous article, ‘The Coming Anarchy’, appeared in the Atlantic Monthly in 1994. Several 
books published by Kaplan focus on the contagious effects of deteriorating social fabrics in 
the third world, which he argues ought to sound the alarm for the rich Western countries, 
prompting them to take more serious action.
10 Among the contending views on both Homer-Dixon and Kaplan’s arguments that relate 
population-environmental variables and violence and conflicts is a book Violent Environment, 
edited by Michael Watts and Nancy Peluso (2001).
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policy, however, is clear, as articulated by Kaplan11 surging populations, 
spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and 
possibly rising sea levels… - developments that will prompt mass migration and in 
turn incite group conflicts.  In a different vein, Homer-Dixon (1999:177), strongly 
notes that …my key finding is straightforward: …scarcity of renewable resources 
– what I call environmental scarcity – can contribute to civil violence, including 
insurgencies and ethnic clashes…In the coming decades the incidence of such violence 
will increase. According to Homer-Dixon, environmental scarcity has three 
causal forms: degradation (supply induced); increased demand (demand 
induced); or unequal resource distribution. The presence of any of these: can 
contribute to civil violence through resource capture (generally by elites) and/
or ecological marginalisation of vulnerable disenfranchised people. Ecological 
marginalisation is often a result of resource capture. Population growth in this 
equation appears centrally as the driving force in all of these causal claims.
Environmental scarcity that originates from the dynamics of 
ecodemographic interactions constitutes the main source of what Homer-
Dixon defines as environmental security (ES). In this regard, as clearly pointed 
out by critics, Homer-Dixon treats environment-conflict linkages as automatic 
and simplifies the complex interconnection of increased environmental scarcity, 
decreased economic activity and migration that purportedly weaken states and cause 
conflict and violence. Peluso and Watts (2001) in the book they edited Violent 
Environments, strongly argue that violence as site-specific phenomena ought 
to be seen as deeply rooted in the societies’ local histories and social relations 
that cannot be isolated from its larger processes of material transformation and 
power relations. Peluso and Watts’ main point is regarding the entitlements 
by which differentiated individuals, households and communities possessed 
or gained access to resources within a structural political economy. It grants 
priority to how these entitlements are distributed, reproduced and fought 
over in the course of shaping, and being shaped by, patterns of accumulation. 
Conditions of resource scarcity do not, contrary to the claims of Homer-
Dixon and others, have a monopoly on violence. In Peluso and Watts’ view, 
abundance and processes of environmental rehabilitation or amelioration, 
rather than simply a shortage, are most often associated with violence.
Ethnicity and Nation-State Building
Ethnicity is generally defined as a sense of group belonging, based on the 
ideas of common origin, history, culture, experience and values. An ethnic 
group is a group with a common ethnic identity or ethnic consciousness. 
Among social scientists that study ethnicity, the notion of ethnic identity 
is usually perceived in two different ways: the so-called primordialist and 
the constructivist. While the primordialists perceive ethnicity as a natural 
result of biological differences, the constructivists, on the other hand, argue 
11 Quoted from Peluso and Watts (2001:3).
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that ethnicity is constructed and reconstructed by social groups. Ethnicity is 
changeable and modified in response to external pressures. The primordialists 
argue that each group has a unique and fixed ethnic identity and normally 
resides in its own territory.  On the ethnic boundary, Fredrik Barth (1969:14) 
noted that:
It is important to recognize that although ethnic categories take cultural 
differences into account, we can assume no simple one-to-one relationship 
between ethnic units and cultural similarities and differences. The features that 
are taken into account are not the sum of “objective” differences, but only those 
which the actors themselves regard as significant. Not only do ecologic variations 
mark and exaggerate differences; some cultural features are used by the actors as 
signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships 
radical differences are played down and denied’. 
The importance of actors in manipulating cultural features in defining 
what constitutes ethnic identity is emphasized in this concept. Ethnic identity in 
turn, plays a crucial role in dividing the population in a particular country into 
culturally different groups. There are almost no countries where their citizens 
belong to a single ethnic group. Most countries are multi ethnic, although in 
many cases there are one or more ethnic groups that are demographically 
dominant. While the difference in population size is crucial in determining 
the power relations among various ethnic groups, population size alone will 
not have any significant impact on the power relationship among ethnic 
groups. In this regard the processes of nation formation and state building 
in communities of colonies in Asia provide good examples in the interplay of 
ethnic group identities and other aspects of the societies.
The process of nation building in many postcolonial states in Asia 
is therefore always related to the problem of maintaining sustainable 
development in multiethnic societies.  Ethnic pluralism is a social reality 
inherited from history but also continues to be part of the making of current 
and future societies in this region. As Esman clearly explains in his book 
Ethnic Politics (1994), ethnic pluralism can be traced to three factors: The first 
is conquest and annexation, when people are defeated and brought under the 
rule of the victor. Soviet Russia is perhaps the best example of this first type; 
the second is the process of European colonisation and decolonisation, which 
assembled and established administrative boundaries for the convenience of 
colonial powers. People who had mutual affinity were often split into two or 
more states governed by different colonial masters. Most states in Southeast 
Asia are of this second type; the third main contributor to ethnic pluralism 
is population movement as people cross-political boundaries in search of 
economic opportunities or religious and political freedoms. This third type 
of ethnic pluralism might be a very common social phenomenon in most 
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countries as movements of people, either for work or refuge, increase rapidly 
in conjunction with the vast process of globalisation and international labour 
migration.
The political circumstance of nation-state building in the post colonial 
states, however, is very problematic. Esman (2004) argues that …as the duty of 
state elites was to build a united and homogenous nation, the duty of ethnic minorities 
was to assimilate; the only acceptable alternative to assimilation was passivity. Yet, 
some cases in Asian states show that minority groups are not only passive 
participants in the process of nation-state building, contrary to the Esman 
observation. Majority-minority ethnic group relationships constantly haunt 
postcolonial states in Asia. The ethnic based conflict that has often broken 
out in the Asian region more often than not constituted the minority group, 
responses to the imposing centralistic and hegemonic policies from the major 
ethnic groups. The current ethnic tensions that in some cases erupted into 
violent conflict in Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, were generally 
related to the majority-minority ethnic group relations.12 Ethnic conflict 
therefore, always entails consideration of the size of groups, the growth rates 
of which are low or negative and who are threatened by assimilation. These 
groups, feeling besieged, respond by cultivating a collective consciousness 
and this frequently includes pronatalist campaigns – non-violent conflicts 
fought over the long term. This kind of demographic ethnic conflict - a culture 
war about numbers - harms no one, but as soon as cynical politicians and their 
followers try to take a shortcut and redress the imbalance by forcible eviction 
of another ethnic group, demographic conditions become lethal.
Bookman (1997) in The Demographic Struggle for Power is perhaps the 
first in locating demographic variables as the major determinants in power 
politics. Bookman shows the importance of group size and how the state, 
engineers demographic conditions for its economic and political interests. The 
term ‘demographic engineering’ was introduced to explain the intricacies of 
demographic factors within national policies.13 According to Bookman, group 
size is important because size translates into greater political power within a 
multi ethnic state, and group size can give legitimacy to demands for political 
autonomy and ultimately the creation of secessionist ethno states. Greater 
group size also facilitates resource competition within multi ethnic states, at 
least partly because of increased ability to manipulate the political process. 
Multiethnic states tend to become arrayed as competing groups battling over 
scarce resources and it is rare for different ethnic groups to have the same 
size and control of resources at any given time. Although there is correlation 
between group size and economic and political power, there are glaring 
exceptions to the rule, the most common being the exploitation of larger 
12  See comparative studies by Gurr on the contentious politics of minority groups and the state 
(1993, 2000)
13 On this issue of demographic engineering as a technique of conflict resolution see also 
McGarry (1998)
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groups by smaller groups with greater access to the forces of social control. 
Bookman also notes that particular groups, such as overseas Chinese living 
in Southeast Asia and the Jews, have often been exceptions to the general 
pattern, at times showing disparities between economic and political power, 
and often obtaining high levels of economic or political power despite of a 
small group size. 
Nation-state building and modernization bring with them increased 
ethnic conflict as different groups begin competing in larger economic and 
political systems in which, at any given time, groups differ in their numbers 
and their control of resources. In such a new political circumstance, people 
are forced into new social relationships and the logical place to begin to 
look for such relationships and to identify oneself as a member of a larger 
something, based upon those attributes that one carries around, namely one’s 
language, historical place, race or religion. Ethnicities in a broader sense 
become very important cultural identifications that are played out within 
the context of power relations and the new politics of identity. This tendency 
may be exacerbated by elites who utilize these tendencies to satisfy their 
own individual interests who may or may not coincide with the interests of 
the group as a whole. In this complex situation the demography of ethnicity 
has been manipulated to serve the powerful elites’ political and economic 
interests.
Southeast Asia:  Spectre of Conflict and Displaced Populations14
The nation-states in Southeast Asia emerged from a combination of nationalist 
movements and negotiations among the former colonial powers strongly 
influenced by the United States as the major super power after the Pacific 
war. Following the contestations between the super powers in the Cold War, 
clearly manifested in the Vietnam War, are perhaps the first major causes 
of forced population displacement in Southeast Asia through which many 
Vietnamese decided to leave their country to seek refuge in other countries. 
The forced migration event that is epitomized in the so-called boat people can 
be seen as the beginning of a refugee crisis in Southeast Asia. The flows of 
Vietnamese refugees into their neighbouring Southeast Asian countries 
provoked the international agencies and Western countries to deal with this 
major humanitarian issue. Again, the rich-north countries played a major role 
in solving the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia, resembling the experience of 
solving the problem of the displaced population in Europe after World War II. 
While the experience of the Vietnamese boat people shows the critical role of 
14 The discussion in this section is partly drawn from my other recent paper on the issue of 
refugees and displaced people in Southeast Asia (Tirtosudarmo 2006a) and my Introductory 
Chapter in the special issue on Forced Migration in Southeast Asia in the Asian Pacific 
Migration Journal (Tirtosudarmo,2006b).
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the West in solving the Vietnamese refugee problem in Malaysia and Indonesia 
by assisting the refugees to resettle in Western countries (USA, Canada, 
Australia); the Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians that were displaced and 
took refuge on the Thai borders remain in limbo until today. This displaced 
population is almost unprotected by any state and therefore very vulnerable 
to various external threats and manipulations. Human trafficking is one of the 
major problems experienced by these displaced people. Forced migration is 
clearly constantly lingering in the lives of the people taking refuge in the Thai-
Vietnam-Cambodia-Laos border regions (Anh, 2004, 2006).
While Thailand seems to enjoy being a nation-state that has never 
experienced Western colonialism, its east and northern border regions have 
become the sanctuary for people fleeing from persecution – most notably 
from Burma. The unresolved internal political problems stemming from 
the unsettled nation building process in Burma have become the source of 
protracted conflict between the military junta and the opposition group led by 
Aung San Suu Kyi as well as the secessionist minority ethnic groups basing 
their armed struggle in the border areas with Thailand.  At present, thousands 
of displaced people residing in the Thai-Burma border areas, most notably 
the Karen, constantly call for both humanitarian assistance and political 
solutions.15 The Muslim Rohinga also escaped and took refuge in Malaysia 
from political persecution in their home, Burma. The Malaysian government 
seems more tolerant toward Muslim refugees, especially the Rohinga, and 
to a lesser extent the Acehnese and Patanis. The unfinished project of nation 
building in the postcolonial states of Southeast Asia also flared up in the 
Southern Philippines in Mindanao, Indonesia’s West Papua and Aceh and 
recently in southern Thailand.16 Conflict and political upheaval following the 
independence and separation of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999, were also 
marked by the dislocation of people. Thousands of former East Timorese were 
forced to leave East Timor and cross the border to Atambua in West Timor, 
Indonesia. This East Timorese displaced population is caught between two 
nationalities as East Timor and no longer part of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Their demographic status poses legal problems as they can be either IDPs or 
refugees.17
These conflict hot spots have produced both refugees and internally 
displaced people that strongly reflect the failure of Southeast Asian states to 
deal with their own domestic politics and their interstate issues especially 
with regard to the problem of cross border forced population movements. 
The discourse on the so-called ‘internally displaced population’ in the region 
15 On the displaced population in the Thai-Burma borders see the intriguing paper ‘The Silence 
and Violence of Forced Migration: The Myanmar-Thailand Border’ in Grundy-Warr (2004)
16 On the political demography of nation-state building in Indonesia, see the Chapter on 
demography and conflict by Tirtosudarmo (2005a).
17 On the East Timorese displaced people see various publications by JRS and Human Rights 
Watch.
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is relatively new. In the Indonesian and Filipino languages, for example, the 
term that is used is pengungsi (Indonesian) and ‘bakwi’ (Filipino) or ‘refugee’ 
if we translate into English. While in the international communities the term 
refugee constitutes a totally different meaning from ‘internally displaced 
population’, in the Indonesian context it is used interchangeably. Pengungsi is 
a very common usage in Indonesia, meaning people that are taking refuge in a 
(temporary) safe place as they were forced to move from their usual residence. 
The reasons for their move range from natural disasters (earthquakes, 
volcanic eruptions) or manmade disasters (flooding, development projects, 
local government eviction from public areas, communal conflicts, and war). 
The forcefulness of circumstances that instigate the movement constitutes 
the main characteristic of the pengungsi phenomena. Seen from this broader 
understanding of causes of the movement, the so-called internally displaced 
population could be something that is nothing new in Indonesia (before and 
since Independence). On the historical perspective of forced migration in 
Indonesia, see Hugo (2006).
The Southeast Asian states’ border areas are now representing a spectre 
of forced population displacement arenas in which various refugees related 
issues such as statelessness, citizenship, human trafficking and identity politics 
are calling for more rigorous academic understanding and more viable policy 
actions. Since then IDPs have been quickly entered into public discourses, 
various institutions, both foreign and local, began to follow the UN steps in 
capitalizing the plight of displaced people that flourished as communal conflicts 
became one facet in the wider context of political changes in the region. The 
displaced population – in terms of their label category - reflects the process 
of forced geographic movement. The critical feature in this event, however, is 
the process of how human beings are compelled to be dispossessed – of their 
material as well as social and cultural belongings. The dispossession process 
is in fact the crux of the matter of any form of forced displacement. At present 
for instance hundreds of Papuans estimated still resided in PNG border areas 
resulted from the military operation against the OPM during the New Order. 
The incident in mid January 2006 concerning the arrival of 43West Papuan 
people (36 adults and 7children) by boat to Far North Queensland seeking 
asylum in Australia is only an indication that the security situation in Papua 
is far from resolved. As the signatory of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Australia is obliged to process 
the future refugee status of these people. The case, however, will likely be 
handled by the Australian government very carefully to avoid an irritating 
reaction from the Indonesian government.
While the pressing needs of the displaced people always have to be given 
immediate priority, such as their safety, their need for shelter and other basic 
needs, yet there are several more fundamental matters that should be given 
serious attention both by scholars and practitioners if long term and viable 
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solutions are to be sought in dealing with displaced populations caused by 
conflict in Southeast Asia. The forcefulness of circumstances that produce a 
displaced population should be seen as part of the longer processes of yet 
unfinished and perhaps failed nation-state building whereby some groups 
of people are firstly being dispossessed and secondly being displaced.  As 
the displaced constitute a dispossessed group of people then the more 
fundamental issues are related to the need for recovering what have been 
lost: their political, property and cultural rights. 
Looking from this broader perspective of the displaced peoples’ rights 
as citizens then what we should envision is perhaps an approach that could 
genuinely provide room to convey the creation of these displaced peoples’ 
own perspectives. In order to facilitate the creation of such a perspective, the 
discourse on refugees and displaced people in the Southeast Asian region 
should be critically assessed and shifted from the current heavily adopted 
programmatic approaches. As Nordstrom and Martin (1992: 15) correctly 
note, social scientists, no matter what their field of study, will in all likelihood 
confront some instance of socio-political violence in the field and they need viable 
field methodologies and theoretical frameworks  if they are to understand the 
processes that involve them as possible victims as well as observers.
Given the increasingly important interconnections that transcend state 
boundaries a more holistic approach is needed in situating Southeast Asia 
in an integrated space rather than separating it into different entities.  Such 
a vision actually is nothing new as for example, has been lamented by Wang 
(2001): 
With very few exceptions, the scholars avoided portraying the local reality as 
integral parts of the unique border-less maritime world of the Malay Archipelago. 
In that world, people were mobile and migratory to a greater extent than we 
realized. It was a world of commerce, including trade over long distances. The 
trade was not only among the Malays themselves, but one that, continuously 
and for centuries, attracted maritime neighbouring peoples from the west and the 
north, including those from mainland Asia. 
 
Wang certainly is not alone in longing for a new light to be shed on 
studies of this region. As Anderson (1998) from a different angle, argues, no 
other region of the world, not Latin America, not the Near East, not Africa, 
and not South Asia, had such a kind of alarming profile as the region that will 
always be an arena for global powers and their interests.18




Demography and population studies lag behind other social science and 
humanities disciplines in responding to the call for studying the emerging 
issues of ethnicity and conflict. The initiatives currently taking place among 
the experts and organizations such as IUSSP (The International Union for 
the Scientific Study of Population), is looking into the question of whether 
ethnicity and conflict should be strengthened and expanded. Ethnicity is 
likely to become a more important dimension on many fronts of human 
affairs as a movement of people becomes the main feature of the current 
global transformation. In such fluid global dynamics old conventional 
ideological tensions will be replaced by new more subtle politics of identity in 
which cultural markers such as ethnicity, religion and race will become major 
influential factors in human affairs. The ethnic diversity of the population in 
every country in Southeast Asia will always challenge the respective state to 
strike a balance among different groups. In this context, demographic change 
resulting from fertility differentials between ethnic or racial groups, could 
have long term serious and political implications in countries like Singapore 
and Malaysia. While the natural increase will have a long term and indirect 
impact, migration will have a more immediate and direct impact on the racial 
and ethnic composition of a country.
The significant contribution of demography and population study in 
its ability to dissect the society based on its composition and distribution of 
culturally defined groups will be instrumental, particularly in our attempt to 
create sustainable development in the near future. The Asian region, Southeast 
Asia in particular, provides an excellent place for our study of the relationships 
among population, ethnicity and conflict. Throughout its history the region 
has become the arena of negotiation between culturally different groups of 
people as a cross border movement strongly characterizes this region. The 
region will also be continuously influenced by economic and political global 
powers and interests. The nation-states apparently will continue to be the 
locus of contention between the global power on the one hand and the ethno-
nationalist as well as indigenous people movements on the other. Group 
interaction – either conflict or cooperation – that is the main feature of politics 
– becomes the norm and value of the Asian region. Movement of people 
between regions provides the social space where different values and norms 
are confronted and in turn result in new hybrids that make regions culturally 
very rich and politically very dynamic. l 
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